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Abstract: The consumption of multi-ingredient foods is increasing across the globe as 
consumers spend less time preparing meals. Traceability is now extensively used to 
reduce information imperfections in food markets and recent EU law suggests it will be 
implemented for manufactured meals as well. We present a model developed to 
understand how information on different ingredients flows through supply chains for 
multi-ingredient food products. The network model has three tiers linked by contracts for 
levels of quality and information. The model is useful for analyzing tradeoffs and 
network effects emerging in the choice of traceability levels. 
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 The Economics of Traceability for Multi-Ingredient Products: 
A Network Approach 
 
 
Asymmetries in or the absence of information on critical attributes cause uncertainty in 
food supply chains. This is particularly true for food safety, including potential 
bioterrorism risks, where multiple parties have an interest in timely access to information. 
Both public and private authorities have advocated traceability as the best tool to solve or 
at least reduce issues associated with inadequate information. Several public traceability 
systems are already in place; they differ across countries and industries, in levels of 
sophistication, and in whether they are mandatory or voluntary. At the same time, private 
systems are proliferating. 
To date studies of the supply of traceability have focused on single ingredient 
products. These may or not be processed along the supply chain but are not combined 
with other products until they reach the consumer. However, in the United States and 
many other countries consumers are increasingly buying and consuming pre-prepared 
meals or meal products that minimize time spent on preparation. Many of these products 
have multiple ingredients and involve a level of processing where an industrial cooking 
facility prepares and packages the final product. 
In addition, when analyzing the economics of traceability the network structure of 
food supply chains and its effects must be recognized and taken into account. Food 
supply chains involve relationships between firms at different stages, whose actions 
impact other firms and consumers with whom they may not have direct contact. When 
the network structure of supply chains is not considered, comparison of different 
traceability systems and their effects on competitiveness and the liability exposure of 
  1firms may be incomplete. The model developed here focuses on the economics of 
traceability for multi-ingredient products, while recognizing network effects. 
 
Network Approaches to the Economics of Markets and Traceability 
 
 
There is a growing body of literature analyzing the economic impact of traceability. 
However, analysis is lacking that considers the many important elements of traceability 
systems in a single framework. Traceability involves coordination of different agents, the 
sharing of information, close links to quality assurance systems, and the development of 
new types of organizations. Economists have considered each of these aspects of 
traceability extensively but independently. 
Traceability is a supply chain issue as it involves coordination of product 
attributes and process information among producers, processors, and distributors. 
Externalities emerging from imperfect information may be considerably amplified as the 
number of agents in the supply chain increases. Furthermore, more complex quality 
assurance and management systems are required as the number of participants at each 
level and the number of levels in the supply chain increase. The literature on networks 
and supply chains provides a framework for building an integrated perspective on 
markets for quality and information. Two main streams of this literature derive from 
industrial organization and from operations research and management science. 
From the industrial organization perspective, the term network relates more to the 
characteristics of a good or a commodity than to firms in supply chains. In their seminal 
paper, Katz and Shapiro (1985) discuss products whose utility of consumption rises with 
the number of consumers using them. They identify three positive consumption 
  2externalities: 1) those generated by the physical effect of the number of purchasers on the 
quality of the product; 2) indirect effects leading to consumption externalities, and 3) 
effects on the quality and availability of post-sale service for durable goods due to the 
experience and size of the network. These externalities are common in products such as 
telephones, computers and associated software, stereos, cars, and a wide variety of other 
products. Katz and Shapiro develop models of oligopolies where consumption 
externalities are present and analyze the effects on competition and compatibility 
decisions. They conclude that the expectations of consumers play an important role in 
markets where network externalities are present and that public intervention may be 
required when the source of network externalities is a compatibility decision. 
Economides (1996) suggests that network externalities imply a need for some sort 
of coordination or compatibility between firms producing goods subject to such effects. 
He distinguishes the “macro” approach to network externalities, which assumes their 
existence and analyzes the impact of such effects, from the “micro” approach that seeks 
to explain the original cause of such effects. Economides proposes a classification of 
networks and models to analyze cases of compatibility and incompatibility, effects on 
industry structure, the importance of sequential games, and markets for adapters and add-
ons. He employs a variety of game theory models to illustrate different problems arising 
in network products and markets, using examples from the telecommunications market. 
The main conclusion is that lessons learned in markets where network effects are 
prevalent apply to other markets structures where vertical relations exist. 
While most food products cannot be classified as network products (Shy 2001), 
network externalities arise in several ways. An example of the kind of network 
  3externalities Katz and Shapiro (1985), Economides (1996), and Shy (2001) focus on is 
the effect of microwave technology on the market for ready to eat frozen meals: there 
was not much incentive for the food industry to produce microwave meals until a 
sufficient number of households adopted the technology. Information on the 
characteristics of food production and processing, which constitute the base of 
traceability, can be analyzed as a network product. Agents in the supply chain may have 
to engage in or avoid actions depending on what they know about what other agents in 
the supply chain are doing. In addition, many agricultural commodities are 
complementary, as in the case of bread and butter, and therefore presumably subject to 
positive network externalities. 
Though these examples illustrate situations where network approaches would be 
welcome in analyzing food markets, to date there is not much research on food as a 
network product. The industrial organization approach to network economics emphasizes 
the need to analyze coordination and the impacts of each firm’s actions on other agents in 
the supply chain.  
From an operations research and management science perspective, network 
economics addresses many different issues from decisions on optimal flows of products 
or production, to storage and distribution locations and the strategic behavior of firms and 
regulating authorities at different levels of supply chains. Fearne (1998), for example, 
uses an operations research perspective to describe the evolution of the British beef 
supply chain. He focuses on motivations for horizontal and vertical relationships, 
developing the concept of a “learning chain,” where competition is increasing between 
food chains, rather than between partners within a supply chain. Supply chains that 
  4establish strong bonds among partners, and that are able and committed to learning from 
their mistakes, will have a better chance of succeeding. 
The management science approach uses mathematical network models to obtain 
quantitative solutions to highly complex problems involving several different agents who 
are linked by different paths in multiple tiered supply chains. Most problems are 
addressed using computational algorithms, such as those based in variation inequality. 
Nagurney (1999) presents this methodology and illustrates its application to 
transportation, information, financial, energy, and communication networks. This 
literature provides important insights into how network externalities influence product 
flows and provides solutions to problems in which different criteria of optimization can 
be simultaneously considered. 
For example, Dong, Zhang, Yan, and Nagurney (2005) develop an application of 
networks models, based on the variation inequality methodology, to multi-tiered supply 
chains where agents have multiple and different criteria and there is uncertainty. They 
consider a supply chain composed of manufacturers, distributors, and retailers who 
compete within a tier but cooperate between tiers. Their conclusions provide equilibrium 
conditions for all agents in the network. The result is an integrated view of the supply 
chain that optimizes the flows for the entire system rather than for individual components. 
The management science approach provides a powerful mathematical framework with 
which to analyze the supply chain as an integrated system of independent agents. 
In addition, contract theory provides a convenient framework to analyze the flow 
of information among participants in a supply chain. The relationships between parties at 
different stages of a food supply chain are often modeled as contracts, where one of the 
  5parties, the principal, needs the other party, an agent, to engage in a costly activity that 
benefits the principal. The principal-agent model is particularly suited for the analysis of 
cases where information is costly. In such cases different organizational forms may be 
more economical than the price system in obtaining efficient outcomes (Silberberg and 
Suen 2001). 
Moral hazard and adverse selection are also issues successfully tackled using a 
principal-agent model. Typically the principal decides what unobservable level of effort e, 
in an interval limited by minimum and maximum levels, will be induced from an agent. 
A contract is designed to obtain such an effort level, with the compensation scheme 
linked to effort levels (Tirole 1988). 
Principal-agent models are widely used to analyze imperfect information issues in 
agricultural and food markets from analysis of poultry contracts to quality assurance 
system applications. Starbird (2005), for example, uses such a model to examine how 
inspection policies affect food safety. A principal decides what price w to pay for higher 
or lower levels of technology and methods used to improve food safety. His main 
conclusion is that the sampling inspection policy has a significant impact on the 
production of safer food. 
The challenge in this paper is to merge the principal agent model into a network 
economics framework. This goal is accomplished by modeling the principal as using a 
price scheme to obtain appropriate levels of quality and information from agents at 
different levels in the supply chain network. 
 
 
  6The Demand for and Supply of Traceability 
 
 
Several different approaches to traceability systems for agricultural and food products are 
already in place. They differ across countries and products, and have been motivated by a 
wide variety of scientific, social, and economic factors. Public and private decisions to 
adopt traceability systems have important economic implications (Hobbs 2003, Golan et 
al. 2003). In addition to their impact on food safety, traceability systems can affect 
animal health and production management decisions (see Disney et al. 2001; Petit 2001; 
Vitiello and Thaler 2001). Traceability also affects the structure of supply chains because 
it requires coordination and allocation of costs and benefits among participants in order to 
work efficiently (Kola and Latvala 2002). 
The economic impacts of traceability have only recently started to be played out. 
Meuwissen, Velthuis, Hogeveen, and Huirne (2003) identify three gaps in the literature: 1) 
what is the break even point for levels of traceability, 2) what are the impacts on current 
liability and recall insurance schemes, 3) how can regulatory incentives be created to 
avoid free-riding? They offer an overview of potential costs and benefits of traceability 
and certification in meat supply chains. Traceability costs are associated with system 
implementation (e.g., changes in procedures, decreased flexibility, and increased 
automation, inventory, personnel, and documentation) and maintenance (through 
auditing). The benefits include increased transparency, reduced risk of liability claims, 
more effective recalls, enhanced logistics, improved control of livestock epidemics, 
possible positive effects on trade, easier product licensing, and possible price premia. 
Hobbs (2002) focuses on the role of traceability in the food system and 
distinguishes “between ex post trace back systems and ex-ante quality verification 
  7systems (p.1)”. Traceability has three main functions: 1) reduce costs associated with 
risks of food safety occurrences; 2) strengthen liability incentives, and 3) allow for ex 
ante verification of credence quality attributes. The main problem yet to be solved is how 
to make sure that the information flow is credible. 
Golan et al. (2003) suggest that traceability is a “record-keeping system primarily 
used to help keep foods with different attributes separate from one another (p. 27).” They 
address the question of the usefulness of mandatory traceability as a policy choice. They 
suggest that mandatory traceability for product differentiation, when it does not target 
specific attributes of value to consumers, will be too costly and unnecessary. Also 
mandatory traceability may be inefficient for the purpose of increasing food system 
safety, as it would reduce the incentives for firms to innovate in order to improve safety 
levels. 
According to Golan et al. (2004), while in Europe traceability has been mainly 
motivated by regulations, in the US it tends to be motivated by economic incentives. 
They surveyed several different systems of traceability in agro-food industries and 
characterized them using three dimensions: depth (how far up and downstream the 
system goes), breadth (how many attributes are traced), and precision (to what extent the 
origin is correctly identified). They found that there is no single best way to introduce 
traceability and there is a large variability in the characteristics of system within and 
across industries, depending on specific attributes of products or motivations to introduce 
traceability. Souza-Monteiro and Caswell (2004) describe and compare mandatory and 
voluntary traceability systems for beef supply chains found in seven countries in terms of 
their depth, breadth, and precision. They show there are considerable differences among 
  8countries and that the European Union and Japan have the most sophisticated systems. 
Different motivations, specific product characteristics, and even socio-cultural patterns 
may determine what levels of traceability are acceptable and to what extent traceability 
should be adopted.  
 
The Demand for Traceability 
 
 
Dickinson and Bailey (2002) analyze the existence of a market for meat traceability in the 
US. Since there is no publicly available data to measure the market for traceability in the 
US, the authors turned to a laboratory experiment to estimate the willingness to pay for 
traceability. Their experimental design follows the one proposed by Shogren, Shin, 
Hayes, and Kliebenstein (1994), in which participants make bids to upgrade a beef or 
pork sandwich. 
The results suggest that consumers from all groups were willing to pay more for 
food safety assurance, a guarantee of humane animal treatment, or no growth hormones 
than for traceability. This study also revealed that traceability was more valued when 
combined with the other attributes tested. The main conclusion is that, if the results 
obtained in the experimental design can be verified with other trials, a profitable market 
for traceability and other assurance systems may exist in the United States. 
Similar experiments conducted by Hobbs (2002, 2003) in Saskatchewan and 
Ontario, showed that Canadians would be willing to pay a premium of less than 10% for 
traceability on a beef sandwich worth C$2.50. However most consumers associated other 
meat characteristics (such as safety and natural production) with traceability, which may 
have inflated the bid values reported. Based on these results, Hobbs concluded that 
  9consumers are not willing to pay for traceability alone. Hence, to have appeal to 
consumers traceability systems should be linked with quality assurance for credence 
goods and provide information before consumption. A further conclusion is that the 
credibility of the source of information matters. Canadian consumers view government 
agencies and independent quality assurance firms as more credible sources of information. 
Overall, the results of research in Canada and the United States suggest that 
traceability alone does not appeal to consumers. Rather it has value to consumers when it 
is associated with a desirable quality assurance system or other product attributes. 
 
The Supply of Traceability 
 
 
To date the analysis of the supply of traceability has mainly focused on the meat and 
grain sectors. For example, Buhr (2003) analyzed the adoption of traceability in the 
European meat and poultry sectors. His findings suggest that information asymmetry 
between final product handler and consumer is one of the reasons to introduce 
traceability. However a stronger motivation is to reduce information issues among 
participants in the supply chain. Incentives to adopt traceability are larger when there is: 
1) high production uncertainty, 2) more doubt associated with moral hazard and 
opportunistic behavior, 3) increasing monitoring costs, and 4) incapacity to identify traits. 
Starbird and Amanor-Boadu (2004) analyze the implications of introducing 
traceability in a food supply chain where there is an inspection protocol. They model the 
relationship between a producer and processor, using principal agent theory. The 
producer is the agent and knows how safe the product is, while the processor (the 
principal) does not know the quality and safety of the product. The processor wants to 
  10offer a price that maximizes his profit while forcing the producer to deliver information 
and a safe product. 
The model developed here departs from the current analysis on the economics of 
traceability in two key ways. First, it embeds the informational and quality assurance 
aspects of traceability in a network model. The linking of information and quality 
assurance is important because research on demand for traceability suggests there may be 
little value to consumers for traceability alone. Furthermore, a network approach is 
necessary to capture interrelationships between members of a supply chain. The second 
point of departure in the model is the consideration of multi-ingredient foods. These 
products are becoming an increasing share of food purchases and can pose complex 
challenges for traceability, including how much traceability to apply to different 
ingredients and the benefits and costs of traceability throughout the supply chain. 
 
Modeling Traceability in Multi-Ingredient Supply Chains 
 
 
Traceability is a flow of higher or lower levels of information on input and product 
characteristics, including origin and process attributes, across agents in the supply chain. 
In the model developed here, information and quality levels are choice variables in an 
optimization problem involving agents in a food supply chain. 
We use the three-tiered network structure presented in figure 1 to model 
traceability in supply chains for multi-ingredient products. This is a hierarchical and 
directed network. According to Jackson (2005), a hierarchical network is one where a 
single actor chooses flows; the decisions depend on a single agent. He defines directed 
  11networks as those where three or more agents do not necessarily need to be connected in 
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Figure 1. Network Structure of a Multi-Ingredient Product Supply Chain 
 
The structure of figure 1 reflects agricultural and food supply chains. Upstream, 
the 1
st tier involves a large number of production agents as is seen at the farm level in 
many food supply chains. The other two tiers in the model involve processing. The 2
nd 
tier processors produce intermediate products or ingredients. The 3
rd tier processor 
produces the final output, which is sold to consumers. In this network, a flow of products 
with chosen quality levels and associated information moves downstream. 
An example of this network structure is a supply chain for frozen pizza 
manufacturing. In the 1
st tier are the producers of commodities (tomatoes, wheat, milk, 
  12etc.). The agents in the 2
nd tier are processors of tomato paste, flour, and cheese. Finally, 
the 3
rd tier processor is the pizza manufacturer selling to consumers. 
This paper focuses on transactions within the network. In reality, any of the 
agents considered may be, and often are, involved in other markets. These markets will 
be considered through the presence of an outside option. The model assumes that the 3
rd 
tier processor only sells one product; again this is a simplification of the reality. 
The network represented in figure 1 can be thought of as a two-stage vertical 
coordination game, where each player has full information about other agent’s strategy 
sets. In the first stage, each of a finite number (n) of 2
nd tier processors chooses levels of 
quality and information to pass downstream, while using prices to induce the quality and 
information levels of the inputs purchased from a pool of m farms in the 1
st tier. In the 2
nd 
stage the 3
rd tier processor decides what levels of information and quality will be required 
from n different ingredient producers. 
The 3
rd tier processor is assumed to be the principal, and the other participants are 
agents, hence the designation as a hierarchical network. Note however that there are 
really two levels of hierarchy because each 2
nd tier firm acts as principal with respect to 
its 1
st tier producers. Furthermore in this network we assume that there are no direct 
transactions between the 3
rd tier processor and the 1
st tier agents. This hierarchy does not 
necessarily imply the existence of market power, which is an issue not discussed in this 
paper. 
Here the principal maximizes its profits, choosing the levels of information and 
quality from its suppliers. These levels of information and quality are important because 
they influence the probability of incurring a loss, imposed by an external party that 
  13monitors the final output of the supply chain. The total loss imposed on the 3
rd tier 
processor is related to the probability of occurrence of a food safety hazard and to the 
levels of information and quality acquired. If the 3
rd tier processor has high levels of 
information and quality, then not only does it have a better chance of preventing any 
hazard but it is also possible that these levels will create goodwill with the external party 
resulting is a lower loss being imposed. Therefore acquiring high levels of quality and 
information has advantages both in prevention and mitigation of losses. Another benefit 
of having more information and quality may be that the technological process of the 3
rd 
tier can be more efficient. Studies on demand for traceability have not clearly established 
the existence of a premium price for traceability (Dickinson and Bailey 2002; Hobbs, 
Bailey, Dickinson, and Haghiri 2005). Here we assume that the price is not influenced by 
the information. 
The model is complex because the quality and information levels change 
vertically and horizontally at different stages of the supply chain. Another complexity 
emerges in the assumption of heterogeneity between agents in the 2
nd tier that produce 
different products. In addition, their products have asymmetric (with respect to the 3
rd tier 
processor) quality and information levels. Finally, there are different agents at both the 1
st 
and 2
nd tier of the network, which prevents the simplification of the analysis based on 
representative firms. Each ingredient used to produce the final product may present 
different food safety hazards, which have to be taken into account by a rational 3
rd tier 
processor. 
Risks of food safety hazards can be significantly mitigated using appropriate 
production processes and technologies. These are constantly changing and in real markets 
  14at any level of the supply chain there is a distribution of firms operating with different 
technologies. To simplify the problem we assume that there are no differences in risks 
associated with processing technologies between producers of the same product in the 1
st 
tier. We also will not consider processing costs throughout, as we assume they do not 
affect decisions over quality and information levels, and assume agents in the 1
st tier 
producing the same input have the same levels of information and quality. The level of 
information is the quantity of information on origin, product attributes, or processing 
technologies; these levels are bounded by a minimum and maximum amount of 
information that agents have available. 
The flow of product and information along the supply chain is governed by the 
objective function of the 3
rd tier processor and by participation and incentive 
compatibility constraints for the other tiers of the supply chain. The participation 
constraints are conditions that have to be met in order for product to flow between 1
st tier 
producers and 2
nd tier processors and between the 2
nd tier and the 3
rd tier processor. 
Incentive compatibility constraints guarantee that agents share higher levels of 
information. Table 1 shows the variables, parameters, and agents used in the model. 
The quality and information variables are treated as indexes. A critical assumption 
is that the information exchanged is truthful. The index of quality contains all the relevant 
quality attributes and the information index comprises all pieces of information that are 
relevant for the agents of the supply chain. We use the symbols  , ,  and  ii i i θ γ Θ Γ  to denote 
lower levels of quality and information respectively at the 1
st and 2
nd tiers. This means 
that all quality attributes are lower and the relevant pieces of information are fewer. The 
  15symbols  , ,  and  ii i θγΘ i Γ  represent higher levels of quality and information respectively 
for the 1
st and 2
nd tiers of the supply chain. 
 ( . ) , , ] ii i gf m q ΘΓ
Table 1. List of Variables, Parameters, and Agents 
Symbol Definition 
P  Price of final output 
ρi  Price paid to 2
nd tier processor i, by the 3
rd tier processor 
pi  Price paid by 2
nd tier processor i to its 1





Quantity of final output obtained at the 3
rd tier level and sold to 
consumers 
fi(m.qi)  Quantity of intermediary product sold by 2
nd tier processor i 
qi   Quantity of commodity supplied by each of m 1
st tier producers 
Π  Profits of 3
rd tier processor 
Ψ  Probability of final output hazards faced by 3
rd tier processor 
Γ  Vector of information levels 
Θ  Vector of quality levels 
Γi  Level of information at each of the 2
nd tier processors 
γi   Level of information at the each of 1
st tier producers 
Θi  Quality level at each of the 2
nd tier processors 
θi  Quality level at the each of 1
st tier producers 
m  Number of agents supplying to each 2
nd d tier processor 
n  Number of 2
nd tier agents and of ingredients used on final output 
c1  Cost of quality borne by each of the 1
st tier producers 
c2  Cost of information borne by each of the 1
st tier producers 
c3  Cost of quality borne by each of the 2
nd tier processors 
c4  Cost of information borne by each of the 2
nd tier processors 
L  Loss incurred by the 3
rd tier processor 
Ui   Outside options of the 2
nd tier processors 
Oi  Outside options of the 1
st tier agents 
αi  Proportion of ingredient i used in the final output 
  16We assume that agents in the 1
st tier are endowed with a quantity (qi) of input to 
sell, which has levels of quality ( [,] ii i θ θθ ∈ ) and information ( [,] ii i γ γγ ∈ ) that may or 
not be passed down. Each unit of input is sold at a price ( ( ii p , ) i θ γ ). The marginal costs 
of quality and information are assumed to be constant. Agents in the 1
st tier make 
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The agents in the 1
st tier may decide not to sell to the 2
nd tier processor; they have 
an outside option in a market where they can sell with a reservation profit level (Oi). The 
participation constraint for the 1
st tier agents is derived as: 
(2)  12 (,) . iii i i i i p qc c O θ γθ γ −−≥  
Assuming agents are indifferent between accepting a contract or not, we have: 
(3)  12
1




c θ γθ ≥+ + γ  
The incentive compatibility constraint must take into account that the 2
nd tier 
processor may induce lower or higher levels of quality and information through varying 
  17prices. Using the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (1a) and (1b) above, each agent in the 1
st tier 

















If lower levels of information and quality are enough, a fixed price that satisfies condition 
(3) is sufficient. The price schedule for the 1
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nd tier processor plays a critical role in the establishment of a farm to fork 
traceability system because it acquires information from 1
st tier producers, which it may 
or not pass downstream. When information obtained from 1
st tier producers is not passed 
down, the traceability system is called one up-one down (i.e., information is maintained 
between adjacent members of the supply chain but not passed to non-adjacent parts of the 
supply chain). Again, agents in the 2
nd tier may choose to induce higher or lower levels of 
information depending on the price they offer to 1
st tier agents, as shown in equation 4. 
At the 2
nd tier stage of the supply chain, the production process changes the 
characteristics of the initial product and generates new quality and information levels. In 
the model there is the same finite number (m) of agents in the 1
st tier supplying each of 
the 2
nd tier processors; the total cost of acquiring information rises over the number of 
suppliers. However the higher the levels of quality and information obtained, the lower is 
the cost of acquiring new quality and information levels by processors on the 2
nd tier. 
The objective function of the 2
nd tier processor is similar to that of 1
st tier agents: 
it chooses quality and information levels to maximize profits. However, each agent on the 
  182
nd tier has a different production function and produces a different product. They each 
have different levels of quality and information. The principal at the 3
rd tier knows the 
implications of the different levels of quality and information on its objective function. 
Hence the objective function for each 2
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The fourth term in the objective function is the cost of acquiring input from the 1
st 
tier (equation (4) is substituted here). As with agents in the 1
st tier, the information and 
quality levels are bounded by lower and higher levels. We assume that all production (fi), 
cost of quality, and cost of information levels are continuous functions. The costs of 
obtaining more information or quality are lower, the higher are the levels obtained from 
1
st tier producers. However, these costs are still linear over the new levels of quality and 
information. This highlights a tradeoff between the price paid for inputs and costs of 
information that may be passed down. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the problem of each 2
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  19As with agents in the 1
st tier, the 2
nd tier processors have an outside option for 
selling their product in which they earn a reservation profit (Ui). Taking this into account 
from the expression (5) above, the participation constraint for the 2
nd tier processors is: 
(6)  i 34 1 4 (,) ( . ) ( ) . ( ) . ( . . ) ii i i i i i ii i i i f mq c c mO c c U ρ θγ θ γ ΘΓ − Θ− Γ− + + ≥  
If each firm is indifferent between accepting a contract from the 3
rd tier processor and 
getting the reservation profit, the following price schedule follows from the participation 
constraint: 
(7)  34 1 4
1
(,) { ( ) . ( ) . ( . . ) }
(.)
ii i i i i ii i i i
ii
Uc c m Oc c
fm q
ρ θγ θ ΘΓ = + Θ+ Γ+ + + γ  
The price schedule faced by 2
nd tier processors has more cases than that of the 1
st 
tier producers. We will assume that a high level of quality and information passed down 
by each 2
nd tier processor (that is , ii Θ Γ ) to the 3
rd tier implies that information and 
quality obtained from the 1
st tier is passed to the 3
rd tier principal. However this does not 
necessarily mean that higher values are contracted with 1
st tier producers. When lower 
levels of information are contracted there is no obligation of passing down information 
on the 1
st tier to the 3
rd tier processor. 
In a sense the 2
nd tier processors are less constrained than agents at the 1
st tier. If 
they accept a price for levels of quality and information, they can offer a price to induce 
levels of quality and information from the 1
st tier that have a direct impact in reducing 
costs. There is a tradeoff between the cost of information and quality induced on the 1
st 
tier and the cost of these levels for the 2
nd tier processors. This leads to opportunities for 
rent seeking conditioned on what contract is offered by the 3
rd tier processor and the ratio 
of costs of information in the 2
nd tier to information and quality prices in the 1
st tier. 
  20Furthermore the price offered to 2
nd tier firms may indirectly affect the decision on what 
price to offer 1
st tier agents. An important network effect emerges through the costs of 
quality and information faced by 2
nd tier processors. 
The objective function of the 3
rd tier processor has three terms: total revenues, 
which depend on price and quantity sold; a cost associated with purchase of inputs; and a 
loss function. The objective function of the principal is defined as: 
(8)                    
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where Χ is a compact set and g is a continuous function. As before all other costs are 
assumed to be zero. Also let Θ= and  1 [ ,..., ]  n Θ Θ 1 [ ,..., ] n Γ =Γ Γ , P is the price paid by 
consumers,  Qg  is the total output sold, and α { . ( ii
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. ), , } i m qΘ Γ i is the fixed but not 
necessarily equal proportion with which each of the ingredients is used in the production 
of final output ( ). The maximization occurs over a vector of quality (Θ) and 
information (Γ) levels induced on each of the suppliers of ingredients. The remaining 
variables are as defined in table 1. 
For the first term of equation (8), the total revenue term, we assume that the price 
paid by consumers is exogenous and independent of quality and information levels. This 
is a restrictive assumption in the case of quality where there is empirical evidence that 
consumers are willing to pay a premium for quality but is much less restrictive in the case 
of information where there is no clear evidence that consumers are willing to pay a 
premium for traceability. This assumption does not mean that information and quality 
  21levels for ingredients have no impact on the revenues of the 3
rd tier processor. In the 
model they do a have positive impact on the processing of the final output, as more 
information on and quality levels in the ingredients improve productivity and efficiency 
through the impact on the production function g. 
The second term in the objective function, the costs associated with acquiring 
ingredients, depends on the levels of quality and information that the principal wants for 
each ingredient. The price schedule offered to each 2
nd tier processor induces these levels 
of quality and information. 
Finally the third term of the objective function is a loss function that captures the 
probability of a loss due to safety hazards emerging in the final output. For this model, 
these hazards are assumed to be due only to the ingredients used in the production of the 
final output. A hazard occurs with probability ( [0,1] Ψ∈ ), which is associated with a loss. 
We assume that when a hazard occurs an external party observes it perfectly and imposes 
a penalty (the loss). When the 3
rd tier processor has high levels of quality in and 
information on the ingredients it uses, the external party takes this into account and 
reduces the total value of the loss when a hazard occurs. This is another incentive for the 
3
rd tier processor to demand high levels of quality and information for purchased 
ingredients.  
The model developed here has a broad range of applications. First it can be seen 
as an institution and then be compared with other institutional settings for traceability. 
This model proposes an institutional arrangement where traceability is voluntary; it is 
entirely up to the 3
rd tier processor to decide on which ingredients traceability will be 
imposed. Also all other parties in the supply chain may choose to sell on their reserve, 
  22outside option market where information and quality are not as important. Second one 
may derive the conditions for full traceability, i.e., the case where all ingredients carry 
full traceability information. Another application is to analyze tradeoffs between quality 
and information levels. Fourth, the model can illustrate tradeoffs between the costs of 
traceability and opportunities for reduction in food safety losses. Finally this model may 
be used to analyze how decisions taken by one element of a multi-tiered supply chain 
impact other firms. The model has applications beyond the food industry (for example in 
the production of personal computers); with appropriate adjustments it can be used to 
illustrate situations emerging in operations research or to obtain quantitative results. 
The model is formulated as a network in order to enable the analysis of network 
effects. A first network effect emerges with positive and negative externalities related to 
complementarities between ingredients. For example, these complementarities exist 
between the ingredients supplied by the 2
nd tier processors because if any of the 
ingredients underperforms then the final product will be affected. A second network 
effect emerges due to the indirect influence of a party at one tier of the network on the 
transactions between parties on the other two tiers. An example is the decision of a 2
nd 
tier processor when choosing which level of information and quality it demands from 1
st 
tier producers. Note that the 3
rd tier firm does not trade with 1
st tier firms, nevertheless the 
objective function of the 3
rd tier firm includes the levels of information and quality 
induced from the 1
st tier, which denotes a network effect. 




The model presented above can be analyzed in diverse ways. Here we derive three results 
based on different combinations of levels of information to illustrate tradeoffs and 
network effects emerging in the model. The first model interpretation focuses on the 
choice on which ingredients will have traceability. This implies a tradeoff between the 
cost of information and the reduction of the probability of losses associated with different 
levels of information. The other two model interpretations focus on the network effects 
associated with complementarities between ingredients used by the 3
rd tier processor and 
with the levels of information demanded from the 1
st tier producers when the price paid 
to the 2
nd tier processor is fixed and a low level of information is elicited. 
For the first interpretation, we assume a one-to-one relationship between the 
quality and information levels, e.g., a low quality level corresponds to a low level of 
information and the same for high levels. We further assume that for the ingredient under 
consideration, the impact of higher levels of information on revenues is negligible, in 
other words the marginal effect of information in the production function (g) of the 3
rd 
tier processor is small. This allows a focus on the tradeoff between the prices associated 
with higher levels of information and their impact on reducing the expected loss due to 
food safety hazards. Depending on the magnitude of this price relative to the reduction of 
losses, the principal will demand a higher or lower level of information flow or 
traceability from 2
nd tier processors. 
This result is obtained by rewriting the objective function of the 3
rd tier processor 
(equation (8)), substituting the second term with the price as defined by equation 7: 
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The marginal effect of information in the first term of equation 9 is not included in this 
equation because, as noted above, the effect of levels of information for ingredient 1 on 
the total output produced is assumed to be very small. 
To interpret equation 10, note that we assumed that the losses are decreasing with 
the information levels, while the prices paid are increasing in such levels. Also note that 
the loss is a ‘bad’ and the firm wants this term to have the smallest possible value. This 
expression says that the marginal effect of information levels on the probable loss must 
be equal to the marginal increase in the cost of acquiring ingredients due to more 
information. If the price paid for higher levels of information is larger than the reduction 
in the probable loss, the 3
rd tier processor will only pay for lower levels of information, 
offering a fixed price. Otherwise higher levels of information are demanded. 
One of main reasons for formulating this model as a network is to account for 
network effects. Two interpretations of the model illustrate why it is important to account 
for these effects. The first relates to the effect of complementarities. In this model, all 
ingredients enter the final product on fixed but not equal proportions. Thus the 3
rd tier 
producer is forced to use all ingredients and all ingredients are complements in the 
production of the final product. However, because the ingredients have different impacts 
on the probable loss, through their quality and information levels, it is possible that 
  25different prices will be paid to different ingredients, depending (among other factors) on 
which respective levels of quality and information the 3
rd tier processor requires. 
Furthermore, if a lower level of information for a given ingredient is contracted, and it is 
later found that a food safety hazard emerges due to this ingredient, the 3
rd tier processor 
and possibly all its suppliers may face the maximum loss. Regardless of the prices 
offered to induce levels of information from the 2
nd tier processors, there is always a 
chance that losses will emerge due to an ingredient that was thought to be less risky. 
A second network effect is associated with the choices of the 2
nd tier processors. 
Suppose a fixed price is offered to a firm at this tier by the 3
rd tier processor, meaning 
that only low levels of information and quality are required. Will the 2
nd tier processor 
necessarily contract a lower level of quality and information from its 1
st tier suppliers? 
The answer is not clear-cut. On the one hand, higher levels of information will require a 
higher price. On the other hand, the costs of obtaining information in the 2
nd tier (even if 
at lower levels) will be smaller if higher levels of information are obtained from the 1
st 
tier processors. A network effect emerges because the levels of information and quality of 
the 1
st tier agents enter the objective function of the 3
rd tier processor. The sign and 




Let us now turn to the circumstances in which a 2
nd tier processor would demand 
higher levels of information from 1
st tier producers, even if it is only required to offer 
lower information levels to the 3
rd tier processor. The participation constraint of the 2
nd 
tier processor given by equation 7 can be rewritten substituting equation 4 (the 
participation constraint for firms in the 1
st tier) for the fourth term inside the curled 
  26brackets, and assuming that a lower level of information from the 2
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This expression can be used to derive another comparing the tradeoff between the 
costs of quality and information on the 2
nd tier and prices paid to 1
st tier producers. First 
create two expressions for the participation constraint of the 2
nd tier processor: one where 
higher levels of information are required from the 1
st tier and the other with lower levels 
of information. Subtracting these two equations and collecting and eliminating common 
terms gives:  
(11)  44 () . (,) () . (,) ii i i i ii i i i cpcp γ θγ γ θγ Γ+ = Γ+  
If this equality holds, the 2
nd tier processor is indifferent between demanding higher or 
lower levels of information from the 1
st tier. Note however that the cost of information 
generated by the 2
nd tier is decreasing with the levels of information from the 1
st tier so 
that: 
(12)  44 () . () . ii i cc i γ γ Γ> Γ 
Hence there are opportunities for cost savings for the 2
nd tier processor when 
obtaining more information from its 1
st tier suppliers. This occurs when the differences in 
prices paid to firms in the 1
st tier for higher or lower levels of information are smaller 
than the respective difference in cost savings. In other words, if the expression (13) below 
holds, 2
nd tier processors will demand high levels of information from 1
st tier producers. 
This in turn impacts the profits of the 3
rd tier processor, generating a network effect: 
(13)  44 () . () . (,) (,) ii ii i i i i i i cc pp γ γθ γ θ Γ− Γ> − γ  
  27This section develops three examples of the insights provided by the model. First, 
interpretation of the model indicates that the level of information (traceability) produced 
by the supply chain critically depends on the relative magnitude of the costs of 
information relative to opportunities for savings due to reductions in the probable losses. 
Imposing high traceability levels on the most risky ingredients does not necessarily 
prevent the occurrence of losses, showing the importance of taking complementarities 
into account. Finally, a network effect emerges from the model in which low levels of 
information induced from a 2
nd tier processor by the 3
rd tier processor do not necessarily 
mean lower levels of information demanded by a 2







This paper proposes a new model for analyzing the adoption of traceability in supply 
chains for multi-ingredient products. Traceability is defined as a flow of an index of 
information between stages of a food supply chain. The aim is to understand how 
information flows occur in a supply chain with three tiers and heterogeneity among 
participants. The model draws on the network economics and contract theory literature to 
develop a directed and hierarchical network structure. 
This paper contributes to the literature in two important ways. The first is in 
highlighting the importance of considering the existence of network effects in analyzing 
traceability. These effects have not been taken into account in research on traceability 
thus far. The second is in considering the case of multi-ingredient products, while 
accounting for heterogeneity in supply chain relationships. Here a producer of a multi-
  28ingredient product chooses levels of information or traceability and quality to reduce 
exposure to losses associated with food safety hazards and to improve productivity. 
However, higher levels of information and quality are more costly. In our formulation, 
network effects are made explicit in the objective function of the 3
rd tier processor, for 
when this party chooses the price to pay for each ingredient, it influences the choices of 
information and quality levels offered by the remaining participants of the supply chain. 
The model can be extended in several ways. First the assumption that the 
information revealed is true can be relaxed, which means that some sort of certification 
mechanism would need to be added. Second the information level of the 2
nd tier 
processor may be a function of the information obtained at the 1
st tier level. The model 
could be extended to account for full traceability in a more explicit way. Third the 
objective function of the principal (the 3
rd tier processor) could be formulated so that the 
probability of a loss is directly associated with the quality and information levels of the 
ingredients. Finally a loss function could be added to the objective function of the 2
nd tier 
processor, to express the possibility of a transfer of losses from the 3
rd tier processor to its 
suppliers. 
This model addresses an institutional setting where firms have total liberty to 
decide whether and to what extent traceability is adopted. An extension to the model 
would adapt it to a context where traceability is mandatory; in such a case a 
governmental authority steps in and imposes a certain level of required information. 
Comparing the voluntary and mandatory institutional settings for the model can provide 
insights into why we already observe differences in traceability systems worldwide. The 
present model assumes full information about other agents’ strategy sets in the supply 
  29chain. If this assumption were relaxed, the market would require revelation and 
monitoring mechanisms. Finally a critical aspect of the model is the definition of the loss 
function. We assume there is a known probability of failures due to safety hazards and 
that the probability is associated with the final product. This probability could be 
expanded so that it becomes a function of the quality of the ingredients, production 
technologies, and security policies. 
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